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Providing safe healthcare in general—and surgery in particular—depends on a wide range of 
factors that span the entire healthcare system. It is inevitable that errors or near-miss events 
will sometimes occur and when patients are inadvertently harmed, the reasons are rarely 
simple or straightforward1. Serious patient safety incidents may have multiple sources, 
including mishaps within surgical teams, resourcing decisions by managers, poor equipment 
design and inadequate regulatory oversight2-3. Improving patient safety therefore depends on 
investigating, understanding and addressing these complex networks of causal factors at all 
levels of the healthcare system in a coordinated way.  
Safety investigations spanning entire systems are routine in other sectors such as the 
aviation, rail and maritime industries. Permanent national safety investigation bodies 
independently examine the causes of safety issues and issue non-punitive and learning-
focused safety recommendations that support system-wide improvement4. This system-wide 
approach is now being emulated by major new initiatives in the Norwegian and English 
healthcare systems, thus becoming the first two countries to establish dedicated, independent 
safety investigation bodies for healthcare. In 2017, England established the Healthcare Safety 
Investigation Branch (HSIB)5 and Norway approved legislation for the National Investigation 
Board for the Health and Care Services (NIBHC)6. The investigation bodies will build new 
and innovative approaches to improving safety and facilitate system-wide learning7. However, 
many challenges lie ahead.  
The core objective of these new investigation bodies is to regularly undertake 
learning-focused and system-wide investigations into serious patient safety issues that span 
the healthcare system. The aspiration is that these bodies will draw on multidisciplinary 
investigation teams with deep clinical, human factors and safety science expertise and will use 
sophisticated methods to develop detailed analysis reports and practical recommendations. 
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These will target all parts of the healthcare system—from the ‘sharp-end’ of practice and 
delivery to the ‘blunt-end’ of regulation and policymaking. Current mechanisms for 
responding to adverse events in healthcare, such as root cause analysis8, supervisory 
investigations or prosecutions9-11, all have limitations12 and can sometimes hinder, rather than 
help, efforts to learn13. Local-level investigations are unable to look beyond the immediate 
healthcare organization; regulatory investigations are unable to examine the regulatory 
failings that may have contributed to an issue; and legal inquiries are focused on establishing 
individual liability and blame rather than identifying opportunities for systems-improvement4. 
Permanent investigation bodies, such as the new HSIB and NIBHC in England and Norway, 
can build reliable structures, methods, and expert teams to routinely conduct system-spanning 
safety investigations for the sole purpose of learning and improvement.  
While these new bodies in England and Norway will differ in operation and approach, 
they share key foundational principles: independence, system-wide, learning-focused, and 
multidisciplinary, as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Key foundational principles of national independent safety investigations 
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Their independence means they have no regulatory or punitive function, are not part of 
the system under investigation and have considerable freedom to select when and what—and 
how—to investigate. In the Norwegian law, NIBHC will investigate ‘severe adverse events’ 
(death or severe harm, where the outcome is unexpected given the foreseeable risk) or ‘severe 
conditions’ (circumstances that can be assumed to cause severe adverse events); the latter may 
include large hospital merger processes, or a series of safety events and near misses14.  
Having a system-wide view is essential. It ensures investigations can encompass all 
potential actors and decisions that influenced an event, from front-line practice to regulatory 
and commissioning levels—which are usually not included in investigations.  
Learning-focused means that no one will be blamed or punished for providing 
information to a safety investigation. Fear of punishment and reputational damage can hamper 
learning by acting as an obstacle in the way of disclosure15. Accordingly, in Norway it is 
mandatory for healthcare professionals to provide information to the NIBHC (upon request by 
the NIBHC) but that information cannot be used by any other body, such as an employer or 
the police, for punitive purposes. The information provided to HSIB in England is likely to be 
treated in the same way16, clearly separating processes of investigation and learning from 
those of blame and punishment.  
A multidisciplinary approach is critical given the complexity of healthcare and patient 
safety. To develop a full understanding of a safety risk — and the actions required to address 
this — investigations need to draw on a variety of clinical and practical expertise, alongside a 
variety of different safety-relevant disciplines such as human factors, systems engineering, 
risk regulation and improvement science. Building these investigation organizations is 
therefore going to be challenging. They must be both independent from and deeply embedded 
in the healthcare systems they are investigating. They must be capable of taking a broad, 
system-wide view while also developing highly targeted, practical recommendations. And 
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they must grapple with the complexities of clinical practice and medical science, as well as 
the nuances of organizational culture and regulatory architecture. This will require careful 
development of the processes, methods, staffing and design of the investigation agencies 
themselves.  
Perhaps one of the most important opportunities for these new investigation bodies is 
to fully engage with the perspectives of patients, families and caretakers, as well as healthcare 
professionals and other stakeholders. The newly developed investigation bodies owe much of 
their existence to the tireless campaigning of patients and families, many of whom have faced 
enormous difficulties in finding out why they themselves or their loved ones have come to 
harm.  
In Norway, patients, users, and close carers will have rights to report events to the 
NIBHC, present their perspective and comment on any draft report before publication to 
ensure it sufficiently incorporates their perspective. Likewise, in England, the HSIB is seeking 
to ensure patients and families are deeply and genuinely engaged throughout an investigation. 
This is essential to build trust in the investigation bodies and their findings. It is also essential 
because patients and families are often the only people with an integrated view of how harm 
unfolds along a complex care pathway. One of the greatest challenges of these new 
investigation bodies may therefore be to ensure that patients, families, carers, healthcare 
workers, regulators and many other stakeholders are all deeply engaged with and trusting of 
the investigation process17-18 — while also ensuring that the investigations conducted by these 
new bodies are focused solely on learning, improvement and system-wide change.  
A key question is how may learning, improvement and system-wide change result 
from the investigations? Research is required to evaluate the processes and outcome in both 
countries over the coming years. Each investigation will result in a publicly available report 
including safety recommendations6, and this should act as a foundation for system-wide 
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learning. Through issuing recommendations, the responsibility to improve is publicly placed 
on key stakeholders14. For instance, HSIB recently published an investigation report into the 
implantation of wrong prostheses during joint replacement surgery. Safety recommendations 
have been directed to different system levels such as the British Standards Institute, 
Department of Health and Social Care and National Joint Registry to undertake actions 
including amending the national prosthesis verification standards, and developing and 
implementing a scanning system to identify wrong prostheses prior to implantation. Deeply 
engaging with key stakeholders and professional communities is therefore key in these 
learning processes, in order to establish specialist working groups to further evaluate and 
actually improve current systems, training and practices. 
Ultimately, learning from system-wide safety investigations is a collective 
responsibility. National investigation bodies do not have the power to require changes or 
mandate improvements—and nor should they, as that would remove their independence. 
Investigation bodies can set the stage for system-wide learning through the quality of their 
investigation analyses, reports, recommendations and stakeholder engagement. But real 
learning and improvement can only come about from the collective efforts, critical reflection 
and material changes made by stakeholders working together to improve safety across the 
healthcare system.  
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